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Abstract 
The Eurozone debt crisis has now reached a turning point. This paper argues for a more organised intervention by 
the ECB to stop contagion through the creation of a quantitative easing programme, coupled with a political 
agreement among member states on a more federalist budget for the Eurozone.  
The roots of this crisis and how institutions have repeated some of the mistakes of the Argentine crisis, both in 1998 
and 2010, are considered in this Policy Brief. The author analyses the reasons why the ECB should start a 
quantitative easing programme to contain government bond yields, and shows that it can be done with limited 
impact on inflation targeting policies. The importance of reinforcing the new policy announced by the ECB, which 
has lain rather dormant during the Eurozone crisis, is also highlighted as a pre-condition for a broader political 
agreement on more harmonised fiscal policies and to stabilise market conditions. Responses must be organised on 
three levels: institutional competences, monetary policy support, and fiscal policy coordination. 
 
Introduction 
As the government debt crisis in the euro area 
unfolds, its sparks panic on alternate days in 
financial markets and a degree of resentment 
among EU member states. The risk that the crisis 
will persist and impede growth in the whole euro 
area is fairly high. Caution should guide the 
actions of European institutions in implementing 
exit strategies, because in a general downward 
economic trend the risk of ‘fire sales’ of assets and 
public finance deterioration may undermine any 
commendable privatisation and liberalisation 
effort (Manasse, 2011; Gros, 2011). In these 
conditions, liquidity problems may easily become 
solvency issues and spread among Eurozone 
countries (via so-called contagion effects). From 
the outset, European governments have believed 
that the sovereign crisis was a mere short-term 
liquidity problem, which has caused political   
deadlock among member states. Responses so far 
have not been able to stop the contagion or 
propose long-term strategies to fill gaps in 
competitiveness and growth. ‘Kicking the can 
down the road’ has contributed to the 
widespread belief that the crisis was somehow a 
temporary problem unconnected to the broader 
political project of the Eurozone.  
Sounder long-term proposals for a revised setting 
of institutional competences and powers need to 
be brought to the table for the Eurozone. The ECB 
could play a key role in this new institutional 
framework. Responses must be organised on 
three levels: institutional competences, a onetary 
policy response, and a fiscal policy response.  
Fiat lux 
Let us go back a few steps. The sovereign crisis 
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common with the Argentine crisis that 
culminated in default in 2001. In the Greek case, 
even economic indicators seem to be following 
the same path, with a stunningly similar 
timeframe but, of course, a different intensity (see 
table below).  
Table 1. Main macroeconomic indicators 
(5 year average) 
 5y  average 
   Argentina  Greece 
  1996-2000 2006-2010 
GDP growth  3.2%  0.7% 
Current Account (%GDP)  -3.7% -12.3% 
Unemployment  16.7%  9.4% 
Public deficit (%GDP)  -2.9% -9.45% 
Public debt  40.1%  118.1% 
Deposits flight (change in bank 
deposits last 12 months)* 
-7% -10% 
* For Greece the period is Apr.10-Apr.11, for Argentina 
Dec.00-Dec.01. 
Source: Alcidi et al. (2011). 
The two countries went into insolvency for two 
different reasons, however. Argentina chose 
parity with the dollar to face the hyperinflation 
that put the country under severe strain during 
the 70s and 80s and, – thanks to the currency 
board – inflation came down drastically to a 
single digit in only a few years. Inflation had been 
a longstanding issue in Argentina since the 
decision in the 70s to devaluate the currency by 
over 100% in order to boost the economy (the so-
called ‘Rodrigazo’s measures’; see Escudé 2002, 
2006), while the world was entering a profound 
oil crisis. Thus, the currency board at the 
beginning of the 90s again gave some credibility 
to the economic and monetary policies of 
Argentina and the country soon regained access 
to financial markets.  
For its part, Greece entered parity with the euro 
as part of a broader political project to push 
financial integration across Europe (first leg), to 
be eventually followed by more harmonised fiscal 
policies capable of pursuing complementary 
economic integration (second leg). As a result, the 
centralisation of monetary policies to the ECB 
moved the issue of credibility straight on to 
national fiscal policies. Greece has always had a 
fairly closed and corporatist economy in which a 
crucial source of economic initiative came from 
public overspending. The crisis has only rendered 
this situation more unsustainable.  
As fiscal policies in both Argentina and Greece 
have failed to gain credibility over time, by not 
being able to minimise the negative effects of 
strong monetary policy decisions, capital and 
deposits have flown into similar investments (but 
in the same currency) outside the country (in the 
case of Greece) or more simply into the parallel 
currency (the dollar for Argentina). Both 
countries also experienced a very low level of 
foreign investment,1 largely due to the concurrent 
devaluation of neighbouring countries’ currencies 
in their regional areas (respectively, Brazil and 
Turkey), and to aspects of traditionally 
corporatist economies. 
As with Argentina, the Eurozone debt crisis is 
seeing exit strategies being implemented by 
international organisations, with a similarly 
questionable level of institutional and political 
support that contributed to Argentina’s serious 
troubles and eventual default.  
On Argentina, the IMF courageously concluded: 
Indeed to the extent that the currency board 
arrangement encouraged the build-up of 
balance sheet mismatches, an earlier exit (e.g., 
in 1992-94 or in 1996-97) would have been 
preferable. Such an exit, had it been 
undertaken sooner, would not have been 
painless, but it would likely have been less 
painful than what actually occurred. This 
illustrates the importance of an appropriate 
macroeconomic policy mix and, more 
specifically, an exchange-rate regime that fits 
a country's economic and political realities 
(emphasis added), (IMF, 2003, p. 70). 
And again: 
In the end, the Fund chose to continue to 
provide financing in the hope that the 
government would deliver on its 
commitments and that confidence and growth 
would return – in effect, allowing the 
authorities to “gamble for redemption”. While 
this strategy – when adopted in early 2001 – 
might have succeeded in a more favourable 
external and political environment, by mid-
2001 the chances of success had become 
                                                      
1 This was a structural issue for a closed economy such as 
Greece, while for Argentina it gradually became an 
important issue as the economy started to decline. THE ORIGINAL SIN OF THE EUROZONE DEBT CRISIS: WHAT LIES AHEAD | 3 
 
minimal. At this stage, the provision of 
significant new financing only postponed the 
inevitable and, by raising the debt burden, 
also meant that the costs of the eventual 
collapse were all the greater, (emphasis added). 
(IMF, 2003, p. 67). 
Both in Argentina and the Eurozone, broader 
political decisions – such as the drastic reduction 
of historically high inflation and promoting 
financial and economic integration, respectively – 
have not been sufficiently supported over time by 
correct monetary policy decisions and 
complementary fiscal policies. The decision to 
issue debt in a currency that the issuing country 
cannot control comes at a cost (Kopf, 2011), which 
in both cases was underestimated in a period of 
growth, by not establishing financial stability 
mechanisms and exit procedures to be used as 
threatening measures to promote fiscal 
adjustments. Argentina has also taught us that 
austerity measures cannot be implemented 
without a plan for investment on long-term key 
drivers of the economy to avoid downward 
pressure on the economy. As a result, wrong 
decisions at the fiscal and monetary policy levels 
have reinforced each other, locking these 
countries in to a brutal spiral of disruption.  
In other words, as a result of hard-pegged 
exchange rates, both countries had seen a gradual 
deterioration of their public finances and general 
economic conditions, due to capital mobility and 
global market events (the financial crises of 1998 
and 2007).  
A ‘game change’ 
With the benefit of hindsight, the objective for EU 
policy-makers today is to succeed where the IMF 
failed with Argentina, avoiding the implosion of 
the Eurozone and the return of Greece and other 
countries to a variable exchange rate to facilitate 
fiscal adjustments. The decision in 1998 to fix 
exchange rates without introducing exit 
procedures2 and mechanisms to support 
imbalances (through a roadmap to create 
                                                      
2 The exit of one or more countries may risk contagion 
effects and turn out to be unworkable for procedural 
reasons (Eichengreen, 2007, 2011). For instance, in the 
process of redenomination of all contracts in the new 
national currency, the country may need to block capital 
outflows as the fear of devaluation will push people to 
shift all remaining deposits and assets into other euro 
area countries. 
harmonised fiscal policies), carries a high price. 
However, the Eurozone is a political decision that 
comes from the willingness of European citizens 
to have a common currency and boost economic 
and financial integration. The political project 
must therefore be preserved.  
To define a response at institutional level, the role 
of key institutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund, must be carefully assessed. The 
IMF has offered financial aid to Argentina and 
Greece to support a decision (the parity with the 
dollar and the creation of the Eurozone) made by 
governments and not by central banks. In effect, 
the political role of the IMF in this and the 
Argentine crisis may be an intrinsic problem. 
Monetary funds are generally tools designed to 
work with short-term liquidity funding problems 
and therefore the conditions attached to the 
intervention as lender of last resort must be based 
on short-term monetary policy issues, rather than 
long-term fiscal and political objectives.  
There was not sufficient attention paid to the 
fact that the structural reforms that were seen 
as critical to growth had largely stalled. Fiscal 
policy assessments were not based on an 
adequate appraisal of the risks to debt 
sustainability in the event of a slowdown in 
growth. (IMF, 2003, p. 71). 
And again: 
[..] in a situation in which the debt dynamics 
are clearly unsustainable, the IMF should 
not provide its financing. (IMF, 2003, p. 72). 
The lesson from that failure was that the IMF 
should only intervene when the three conditions 
below are met: 
1.  A short-term liquidity problem, rather than a 
long-term solvency issue; 
2.  The country’s ‘lender of last resort’ (central 
bank) does not have enough resources to 
tackle the liquidity crisis; and  
3.  Intervention must be conditioned to a change 
in the monetary policy of the beneficiary.  
In the case of Argentina, the condition for the IMF 
intervention could have been the exit from the 
parity with the dollar, which was clearly 
unsustainable (at least a few years after its 
introduction), rather than supporting decisions 
made by governments (with its official blessing). 
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the Eurozone crisis and taken on the ECB’s role of 
lender of last resort. The sole condition for the 
intervention in the Eurozone crisis should have 
been to help Greece and its central bank to exit 
the euro area, providing funding and jointly 
defining a new exchange rate around its economy 
and competitiveness. The IMF has thus implicitly 
decided to support, with the funding of Eurozone 
member states, a situation fed by a political 
impasse. The idea of being able to solve a long-
term structural political problem through short-
term funding relief, such as the IMF or similar 
tools (e.g. the EFSF) linked to austerity fiscal 
measures, is questionable. Long-term fiscal 
problems and competitiveness issues should be 
the prerogative of other supra-national 
institutions – such as the World Bank and the 
European Commission (for the EU) – with the 
independent support of central banks, by setting 
the right framework for fiscal policies to be most 
effective.  
A quantitative easing for the euro area  
As the public debt situation becomes more 
intricate and complex, the ECB (and the 
Eurosystem) – with the recent decision to buy 
consistent amounts of government bonds and 
after the tacit approval of France and Germany – 
has taken on the role of lender of last resort to 
finally respond to the gravity of this crisis (ECB, 
2011).  The ECB acknowledges that by allowing 
‘selective/restricted defaults’, contagion effects 
would most likely spread among euro area 
countries and, with no support for the 
implementation of austerity measures, pressures 
from public opinion would gradually lead those 
countries to quit the Eurozone and adjust 
exchange rates, with all the unpredictable 
consequences this would have. 
In effect, the ECB has so far been defending the 
supposed inflation targeting (in)action at the cost 
of breaking up the Eurozone and creating 
intolerable social conflict and economic 
disparities. The existence of the Eurozone itself 
should come before price stability. The ECB 
intervention would therefore not have to save a 
political project but rather to support countries 
that have been hit by losing control of monetary 
policies.  
The ECB, as emergency backstop of the Eurozone, 
should therefore have intervened from the 
beginning to stabilise the Eurozone secondary 
markets for government bonds, to avoid the 
clashes of a tough political arena, and most 
important, to make sure liquidity issues would 
not rapidly turn into solvency crises. A political 
impasse has slowed down interventions (even 
those with small numbers in comparison to the 
Eurozone GDP and government revenues) by 
subjecting each bail-out programme to heavy 
political (and public opinion) backfire from 
funding countries and injecting uncertainty into 
global markets.  
As long as the Eurozone refrains from deploying 
all its potential resources to make markets believe 
that countries are doing everything possible to 
avoid default, the situation will not stabilise 
(Zingales, 2011).  
The decision to buy bonds in the market may not 
be enough. The Eurosystem should therefore 
stand ready with immediate effect to contribute 
with a quantitative easing (QE) programme to 
purchase government bonds of the euro area in 
the secondary market, in the same way they 
racked up the financial crisis covered bonds from 
financial institutions during the crisis to stabilise 
the money market and then real interest rates. 
The ECB should disclose the amounts and 
modalities of the auctions of its Securities 
Markets Programme. In effect, the intervention of 
the ECB would be a natural thing, as it should be 
one of its objectives to participate and support the 
sovereign bond secondary markets, as lender of 
last resort in emergency situations (De Grauwe, 
2011), in which markets have lost confidence that 
current solutions (EFSF and ESM) and political 
support will be able to rescue huge Eurozone 
debts, such as the Italian one. The central bank 
action should resolve the coordination issues 
among member states that create instability in 
financial markets, high volatile patterns and a 
potential freeze in the interbank money market.  
Finally, competing QE programmes, such as 
those of the UK and the US, also contribute to the 
appetite for lower risk Eurozone bonds among 
international investors, as they may see markets 
supported by own central banks as being safer.  
Two classical objections to a QE 
The two classical objections to a QE by the ECB 
are the risk of moral hazard by member states, 
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mission set out in the ECB statute and the 
European Treaty (TFEU, Art. 121.1).  
The moral hazard problem, as with financial 
institutions, is a problem of supervision and 
monitoring costs. In an institutional setting such 
as the Eurozone, formal control over member 
states’ new issuances can be carried on jointly by 
the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank. Procedures must be designed to 
impose – on countries benefiting from a QE 
programme – a formal approval for new 
emissions by the ECB and Commission in case no 
austerity measures have been implemented. 
Additional sanctioning measures can be imposed 
through cutting resources pumped into the 
economy of the troubled country to support 
austerity measures. In this way, European 
institutions would also exercise a stricter indirect 
control on national fiscal budgets (see below, final 
section). The ECB will only intervene to support 
secondary markets and bond yields. 
The impact of a QE on the price stability mission 
must be assessed from a legal and 
economic/financial standpoint. Legally, looking 
closely at the Treaty (Art. 121), the purchase of 
government bonds in secondary markets would 
not infringe the rules assigning competences to 
the European Central Bank and its price stability 
mission (Buiter, 2009), especially if the 
programme is backed up by greater contributions 
of NCBs to the capital of the ECB. In addition, 
another banking crisis fuelled by sovereign 
defaults would definitely hamper monetary 
transmission channels. The Eurosystem, as shown 
below, was already active in purchasing covered 
and government bonds to help financial 
institutions, both in 2009 and 2010 (roughly 
€60.87 bn; ECB, 2010).  
From an economic and financial standpoint, the 
Eurosystem can certainly carry on a QE via 
several tools available on its balance sheet.3 So 
far, the Eurosystem has provided liquidity to 
financial institutions with a net lending of €135.28 
bn4 (total lending of €505.13 bn). The average 
                                                      
3 Interestingly, the BoE is carrying on its QE by funding 
an off-balance sheet fund that has the power to acquire 
UK gilts like other financial institutions in the market. 
4 The net lending is calculated as the difference between 
the total lending of the ECB to financial institutions 
minus all deposits held at the Eurosystem. 
annual net interest rate5 on its assets is 1.02%. The 
table below compares key items of the balance 
sheet of the Federal Reserve, Eurosystem and 
Bank of England.  
At the end of Q1 2011, the Eurozone has the 
world’s biggest gold reserve and, comparing key 
indicators (shaded areas) with the BoE and the 
FED, the Eurosystem consolidated balance sheet 
so far shows very low market activism, in line 
with its decision not to be directly involved in the 
sovereign debt crisis. The Eurosystem has only 
been active in offering repurchasing agreements 
(‘repo’) for financial institutions to support 
markets indirectly.  
Total assets are 3.4 times gold and FX reserves, 
while securities held in portfolio represent only 
25.76% of total assets in comparison to over 90% 
for the BoE and over 80% for the FED. In 
addition, the Eurosystem consolidated balance 
sheet holds only 5.45% of total outstanding 
government securities, and just 1.29% purchased 
in the last year for monetary policy purposes. The 
BoE and FED have proportionally more than 
three and two times this amount. By July 2011, 
the Eurosystem had purchased the government 
bonds of Greece, Portugal and Ireland for roughly 
€74 bn, plus circa €33 bn by the ECB directly. 
As a result, the ECB can both increase the size of 
the balance sheet and adjust the assets side with 
very limited impact (if any) on inflation targeting 
policies. Expanding the assets side can be 
achieved with two sets of operations. Firstly, by 
tightening repo transactions policies (removing 
discretionary decisions in the application of 
requirements such as the ‘minimum rating’) and 
dismissing most liquid financial instruments – 
such as most of the €60.87 bn purchased under 
the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) – 
thereby trying to exploit up to €316.66 bn that are 
currently booked on the balance sheet as 
revaluation accounts.  
                                                      
5 The difference between the annual weighted average 
interest rate paid on deposits (liabilities) and the annual 
weighted average interest rate received on lending 
operations towards euro-area credit institutions.  6 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
 
Table 2. FED-BoE-ECB key balance sheet indicators (€mn)* 
  Federal Reserve  Eurosystem  Bank of England 
Gold (Q1 2011) ^  261,480.86  363,250  9,975.93 
FX currencies (Q1 2011)^  89,134.39  222,419.64  52,357.99 
Tot. 350,615.25  585,669.64  62,333.91 
Total assets  2,275,768***  2,000,471  256,502.48 
xtimes Gold/FX  X6.49  x3.42 x4.12 
Notes and coin (M0)  716,979  855,737  67,974 
% tot. assets  31.5%  42.78%  26.50% 
xtimes Gold/FX  x2.05 x1.46 x1.09 
M2 aggregate  6,472,795  8,489,167  2,359,698 
Government securities°  1,139,160  457,426**  224,613 
Other securities  701,633  60,873  8,883 
Tot. 1,840,793  518,299 233,496 
% tot. assets  80.89%  25.76% 91.03% 
xtimes M0   x2.57  x0.61 x3.44 
Capital 35,969  81,480  5,011 
% tot. assets  1.58%  4.07%  7.37% 
Reserves balances 
(minimum and excess) 
892,809 208,285 145,345 
% tot. assets  39,23%  10.41%  56.66% 
Govt debt (securities 
outstanding) 
10,129,952 8,323,500 1,268,200 
Govt sec held/Tot.  11,25%  5.45%** 17.71% 
Interbank rates (Aug 4th)∞ 0.09%  0.851%  0.54% 
Nominal interest rates   0.25%  1.50%  0.50% 
Excess reserves rates  0.25%  0%  n/a 
Deposit Facility 
0.28% 
(term dep. on July 26th) 
0.75% 0.25% 
* Updated to end July/August 2011 where not otherwise indicated. Exchange rates at end of Q2 2011 (EUR/USD: 1.4391; 
EUR/GBP: 0.88274; ECB data warehouse; gold price at Q2 2011; World Gold Council). 
** Estimates (assuming that the Eurosystem does not hold other securities than covered and government bonds). ECB holds 
€33.94 bn directly and roughly other 74 €bn for monetary policy operations. The remaining government bonds are held by 
national central banks and may have been sitting on their balance sheet from the inception of the euro. 
*** It includes gold reserves at their current value.  
° Securities of their national government(s) held in portfolio or resources allocated to purchases (e.g. BoE). 
^ Value at end of Q1 2011. In the US, gold reserves and receivables are usually posted on balance sheet at a price of $42 2/9, 
roughly $11 bn. Gold and FX do not usually generate monetary income. 
∞ Federal funds rate (US), EONIA (EU), and SONIA (UK). 
Sources: Author from FED, BoE and ECB database, World Gold Council, AMECO database, and Eurostat. THE ORIGINAL SIN OF THE EUROZONE DEBT CRISIS: WHAT LIES AHEAD | 7 
 
Table 3. Outstanding securities portfolio breakdown 
(top 4 euro countries; €bn) 
Central 
bank 
Securities 
held in 
portfolio  
Covered 
bonds 
Government 
debt 
Germany  36.2 15.6  20.6* 
Italy  84.4 10.1  74.32 
Spain  87.83 7.39  80.43* 
France  90.4 21.3  59.5 
Tot.  295.83  54.39  234.85 
*estimates 
Source: Author from central banks’ annual reports. 
The table above shows the current securities 
holdings of the top four Eurozone central banks. 
In line with its official political position, and 
despite the fact that is the biggest economy of the 
Eurozone, Germany’s central bank only holds 
roughly €20 bn in government debt. The Banque 
de France has the biggest securities portfolio, 
closely followed by Spain and Italy. Most of these 
government bonds have been sitting on the 
NCBs’ balance sheets since well before the crisis 
began. 
Additional contributions to a QE programme can 
also come from national central banks, which can 
fuel additional available resources into the capital 
of the Eurosystem, which is today roughly €81 bn 
(including past reserves), or directly into the 
capital of the ECB (roughly €10 bn). Tightening 
repo transactions policies, dismissing most liquid 
financial instruments, and increasing the capital 
contribution of NCBs’ actions would certainly 
have no impact on price stability mechanisms. 
Secondly, there are other available tools that may 
have an indirect but very limited impact on 
inflation targeting policies. For instance, the 
Federal Reserve buys treasuries on secondary 
markets (through public auctions) and typically 
wires funds into current accounts held by 
clearing house banks at the central bank. 
Financial institutions receiving these funds use 
very limited amounts because the FED gives an 
interest on excess reserves that is higher than the 
federal funds rate and roughly the same as term 
deposit facilities (see Table 2, above). The 
payment of these interests may require liquidity 
injections into the system, but – assuming 
governments will sooner or later be back on track 
– transactions may be sterilised by selling those 
securities when markets recover. For its part, the 
ECB does not offer any interest on excess reserves 
at the moment and the main interbank rate is 
consistently higher than the US one, the use of the 
same tool should therefore be coupled with 
actions in the interbank money market by acting 
on discount rates and reserves requirements. In 
addition, the ECB should disclose details of the 
QE, in particular the total amount of expected 
purchases and how these securities will be 
bought (preferably through public auctions). 
The potentially deployable firepower would 
certainly be big enough to restore market 
confidence that European institutions are able to 
face risks of default and to sustain countries’ 
market fundamentals in the medium term. In 
addition, the ECB can always use, as a ‘last resort’ 
tool, the possibility to act on nominal interest 
rates and expand the monetary base.  
Why a quantitative easing? 
The Eurosystem is already indirectly active in the 
sovereign bond market by financing financial 
institutions and by offering repo lending at 
better-than-current-market conditions, thereby 
supporting artificial market access for countries 
such as Greece and Portugal. By so far only 
accepting Greek and other public debt securities 
as collateral, however, the ECB has not removed 
the risk that it is indirectly taking on, even if it is 
off balance sheet. If Greece and other peripheral 
countries’ default, in effect, there is a high chance 
that the European banking system will experience 
a profound crisis, which would freeze the 
interbank market and call the ECB indirectly into 
play by accepting losses on the collateral it is 
currently holding. The ECB is therefore not only 
providing repo money with lower-than-market-
value haircuts, it is also indirectly placing implicit 
guarantees on the default of sovereigns. In this 
way, financial institutions enjoy the benefits of a 
potential recovery, while the costs will ultimately 
be borne by the ECB.  
A direct intervention would create more 
favourable conditions for a ‘game change’, even 
though it is certainly not the only action needed 
to solve this crisis (see last section). In effect, a 
broad programme of government bonds 
purchases in the secondary market can have 
multiple effects. 8 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
 
1.  It would stabilise market mechanisms more 
naturally, by minimising perverse downward 
market pressures and temporarily recreating 
more favourable market conditions, boosting 
appetite for risk in investors. For instance, the 
yields on US treasuries have remained stable 
and even at lower-than-expected levels when 
the FED announced the end of the QE2 and 
throughout the recent discussions about the 
debt ceiling, showing that the support of the 
central bank managed to create confidence and 
a risk appetite among international investors 
over time. Of course, this risk appetite will 
only be short-term if the US does not address 
its worrying fiscal position. Bonds must be 
bought through market auctions at current 
rates to lower haircuts towards zero, which is a 
typical component of government securities. 
Improved market conditions would also 
indirectly benefit the interbank market, the 
money market and real interest rates. 
Purchases must then be targeted to those key 
instruments ensuring market liquidity. 86% of 
bonds purchases by the FED are in treasuries 
of between 2.5 and 10 years’ maturity. Finally, 
the ECB must disclose the size of the 
quantitative easing programme, as well as the 
kind of instruments and maturities of each 
purchase over time.  
2.  Booking government debt securities on the 
balance sheet of the central bank has several 
positive implications. First, burden sharing – 
through contributions by NCBs to the capital 
of the ECB – may allow the Eurosystem to 
provide more flexible and immediate 
responses to liquidity crises than rescue plans 
that require lengthy political processing 
through national parliaments. Second, the 
political pressure to apply fiscal austerity 
measures would be exercised by the ECB and 
other EU institutions on the more credible 
threat that the programme would stop as soon 
as fiscal measures stop or slow down. Third, 
the debt will finally sit on the Eurosystem 
balance sheet, which would allow more 
control if the country gets into liquidity 
troubles or succeed with their fiscal 
adjustments (sterilisation). Finally, it may be 
partially written off as a reward if the country 
successfully applies austerity measures and 
structural reforms. 
3.  ‘Buying debt’ will also slow down the pro-
cyclical mechanisms of rating downgrades and 
limit their role in this crisis, even though it 
does not solve the issue of the role of ratings 
granted by regulators in capital requirements 
regulation. 
4.  It will limit the hold-up of financial institutions 
(by holding these instruments) as well as 
limiting their moral hazard, which remains a 
relevant issue with repo transactions. 
5.  Most important, a QE would free the European 
Commission of the heavy political burden to 
seek approval for rescue plans on behalf of 
member states. In effect, the ECB intervention 
would allow the Commission and national 
governments to seek broader political 
coordination on more fundamental issues, 
such as internal imbalances and anaemic 
growth. European institutions, such as the 
European Commission, would have enough 
time to work, in line with the Treaty, on long-
term solutions to boost competitiveness and 
reforms in the Eurozone. This reshuffling of 
competences among EU authorities would also 
give them enough time to consider the 
developments in a global economy that is 
inexorably moving its centre of gravity away 
from Western countries towards emerging 
economies.  
A well-designed programme can stabilise 
markets by signalling that the ECB is willing to 
relax its price stability mission to avoid the 
default of the Eurozone. 
The way ahead: towards a more ‘federal’ 
solution 
Once mechanisms have been put in place to 
prevent moral hazard and to ensure the ECB’s 
independence, the decision of the ECB to approve 
a broader purchase programme to support 
Eurozone member states would stimulate 
member states and other European institutions to 
follow up this decision with fiscal adjustments, 
and more harmonised and federalist fiscal 
policies. The QE actually draws the missing link 
between a common monetary policy and a 
mechanism for more coordinated fiscal policies. 
Member states would irremediably not be able to 
bargain their burden share to sustain the euro 
area (as indirectly and independently done by the 
intervention of the ECB, with its implications for THE ORIGINAL SIN OF THE EUROZONE DEBT CRISIS: WHAT LIES AHEAD | 9 
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Figure 1. Eurozone's current accounts balances (% GDP) 
Source: Eurostat. 
nominal and relative prices), so they would be 
forced to try to exercise greater control by 
promoting adjustments, structural reforms and 
austerity measures through a Eurozone budget. If 
they keep ignoring the ECB intervention, the 
central bank must stop the programme, which 
would plunge member states back into deep 
water.  
Concerning fiscal policies, since its inception the 
common currency has boosted regional 
imbalances in the euro area in favour of those 
countries that could compete more in global 
markets. Countries such as Germany,6 Finland 
and the Netherlands have enjoyed and are 
enjoying high surpluses7 in the short term, also 
thanks to the euro, which has allowed them to 
exploit even more their long-term advantage in 
competitiveness over southern European 
countries.  
                                                      
6 It is also true that in the mid-90s Germany implemented 
reforms that blocked salaries for some years while it 
invested in innovation, but this does not explain the 
perfect timing in which the current account rose above 
5% after the introduction of the euro. 
7 The recent slowdown in the global economy is currently 
affecting the current account balance of these countries, 
which still remains fairly high in comparison to 
peripheral Eurozone countries.  
The figure on this page shows trends in current 
accounts deficit/surplus among major Eurozone 
countries. Not surprisingly, Germany –
historically a competitive country with a high 
level of innovation – has immediately 
experienced a bounce into the surplus area (and 
now consistently above 5%) since the 
introduction of the common currency. Countries 
like Italy and France, on the other hand, have 
seen a gradual deterioration of their current 
account balance since the common currency was 
introduced. 
Bail-out programmes have so far been simply 
short-term measures in which wealthier countries 
have contributed with a minimal part of their 
budget to strengthen the system that allowed 
them to become stronger. It is also undeniable 
that the Eurozone has supported uncompetitive 
countries, bringing their debt burdens into the 
area of apparent 
sustainability. In effect, 
this situation has 
created, on the one 
side, moral hazard by 
myopic governments 
and leaders that saw 
the possibility to 
borrow at a lower cost 
to finance public 
expenditures, rather 
than as an opportunity 
to reinforce fiscal 
positions and promote 
less popular structural 
reforms to fill the 
competitiveness gap. 
On the other side, 
structural reforms may 
take years and cannot 
be carried out only 
through cheaper access 
to markets, without the 
support of long-term investments programmes. 
Bolder and more long-term-oriented proposals 
for a Eurozone fiscal budget must be brought to 
the table (Jutta et al., 2011). Contributions to a 
more federalist Eurozone budget may be 
supported by a Eurobonds issuance, and should 
also be indexed to the level of surplus that 
countries enjoy, primarily thanks to the common 
currency. A more federal budget should provide 
fiscal support, in particular to those countries 10 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
 
carrying out painful fiscal adjustments and long-
term economic reforms, which will always lag 
behind in a competitive (and non-federalist) 
regional area. Proposals of course must be 
supported by stronger intervention powers with 
effective sanctioning systems. Reforms cannot be 
implemented only through austerity, but they 
need to be softened by investments, which will 
minimise the probability that the country falls 
into loss aversion. More specifically, loss aversion 
means that if the public opinion of the country 
under stress perceives a choice between two 
losses – fiscal austerity measures (loss with high 
probability but ‘low’ impact) versus the risk of 
being caught if you don’t pay taxes (loss with low 
probability but much higher impact) – they may 
become risk-seekers, thereby pushing the country 
to fail fiscal adjustments (as for Argentina) quit 
the eurozone, and revert to a floating nominal 
exchange rate. 
The uncertainty around the solutions that will be 
finally taken at the end of a long political process 
gives us the opportunity to elaborate four 
potential scenarios that may lie ahead for the 
Eurozone.  
1.  ‘Dream’ scenario 
The temporary rescue plans (supported by the 
ECB until the European Financial Stability 
Facility enters into force) succeed in dealing with 
liquidity issues and pushing austerity measures. 
The economy becomes more open and capital 
inflows increases. The sustainability of public 
finance and confidence in the government bond 
market gradually return to normality. The 
economy returns to a level of growth sufficient to 
promote prosperity. There is no debt 
restructuring or default and the debt dynamics 
become more sustainable. 
2.  ‘Pessimistic’ scenario 
No political support to expand rescue plans and 
accept a stronger ECB intervention. Greece and 
possibly other countries unilaterally decide to exit 
the Eurozone. The currency will adjust and euro-
denominated debt remains until maturity, if it is 
not under domestic law (e.g. 90% of Greek debt is 
under domestic law). However, in the short term, 
there will anyway be a default8 until the 
                                                      
8 It may not necessarily be ‘evil’ for a sovereign to default. 
History shows that sovereign defaults are typically 
procedure to exit the Eurozone has been fully 
implemented. An exit procedure from a common 
currency union has never been implemented 
before and may take years. The country will then 
be officially on its own. In the meantime, this will 
not stop contagion effects among other EU 
countries. 
3.   ‘Muddle-through’ scenario  
Rescue plans and temporary ECB intervention do 
not succeed in pushing Greece and other 
peripheral countries back on the track of 
sustainable public finances (dream scenario). The 
Eurozone will keep providing resources through 
rescue plans approved by member states until the 
wealthier countries decide to swithch off the tap. 
This situation triggers a hard restructuring or 
simply a default for Greece (followed perhaps by 
other countries, such as Portugal and Spain, in 
the short term). The interbank market will most 
likely freeze if the ECB does not intervene again. 
However, Greece and Portugal (as well as other 
potentially defaulting countries) may only decide 
to remain in the Eurozone in the short/medium 
term. Risk will certainly spread to other countries, 
mainly because markets anticipate the fact that 
there will not be enough political support (if no 
strong ECB intervention) to rescue countries as 
Spain, and Italy, for instance. As stated, market 
confidence in Eurozone sovereigns is built on the 
implicit guarantees of stronger countries. If they 
threaten to withdraw these guarantees, the value 
of peripheral sovereign debt plunges according to 
their economic fundamentals. Even more solid 
countries, such as France, will eventually suffer 
contagion effects. The future tensions that this 
situation may create would create the Eurozone 
to break up and to perhaps keep the common 
currency area only in few continental countries. 
4.   ‘Game change’ scenario 
The ECB shows its muscle and decides to 
intervene directly in the market to solve the short-
term liquidity needs with a medium-term QE 
programme, as discussed above. The intervention 
also succeeds in designing an appropriate 
burden-sharing among NCBs through greater 
contribution to capital and reserves, and it also 
stimulates member states to find greater 
coordination of fiscal policies. In effect, in parallel 
                                                                                          
followed by sustained economic recovery, as in the case 
of Argentina (Panizza et al., 2009). THE ORIGINAL SIN OF THE EUROZONE DEBT CRISIS: WHAT LIES AHEAD | 11 
 
to the ECB intervention, Eurozone member states 
– feeling they are losing direct control on burden-
sharing mechanisms in the European Monetary 
Union – and the European Commission decide to 
seek political agreement on a process of greater 
economic integration via a Eurozone federal 
budget (supported by Eurobond issuances). In 
the meantime, the Commission will inject new 
resources for long-term investments (to support 
austerity measures) and – jointly with the ECB – 
will supervise the implementation of austerity 
measures and predispose an official exit 
procedure from the Eurozone, threatening to use 
the procedure and stop the QE and other liquidity 
support for countries that do not comply. 
Additionally, member states will be forced to find 
a broad and stable political agreement by the 
indirect burden-sharing imposed by the 
independent ECB intervention. Once a more 
federal budget is agreed, the Commission (with 
the support of national governments) will 
elaborate a long-term strategy to boost 
competitiveness in troubled countries and to 
implement even more structural reforms and 
investments in innovation. Essential to this 
broader action is the definition of an effective 
mechanism of sanctioning/rewarding for ‘net-
receiver’ countries, as well as an exit procedure 
from the Eurozone if sanctions are not enough.  
Conclusions 
The Eurozone is at a turning point. We can either 
sink in the mire of our debt and go back to weak 
national policies that will destroy the euro area, 
or decide to build a more integrated European 
economy by strengthening efforts towards more 
coordinated fiscal policies. In effect, monetary 
union has been a great tool with which to increase 
financial integration in the euro area, but it has 
not seriously addressed issues of economic 
integration and competitiveness. Despite high-
level commitments, the original sin of the crisis 
lay in the decision to harmonise monetary 
policies without harmonising or strengthening 
Eurozone fiscal policies. 
The way forward must be designed around three 
actions: redefining institutional competences 
among international organisations; strengthening 
ECB policy as ‘lender of last resort’ for its 
members; and increasing coordination among 
euro area members around fiscal policies.  
The whole Eurozone has been built on the 
implicit guarantees of stronger countries. If 
markets feel at any stage that these guarantees 
may no longer be there, because certain countries 
are not using all possible means to avoid a 
default, they withdraw capital and investments in 
weaker countries in favour of the stronger ones or 
other regional areas of the global economy.  
Alternatives to the two-tier long-term exit 
strategy (quantitative easing and a more federal 
budget) described above seem so far unable to 
tackle the financial instability and structural 
regional imbalances that lie behind the inception 
of the monetary union. The role of European 
monetary funds and the IMF cannot be elevated 
to a panacea for this crisis, as they are tools to 
help countries in very specific and limited 
circumstances. The time for endless political 
compromises is up. Now is the time to push our 
leaders to take their responsibilities by embracing 
a new age for the euro area that could avert an 
unsettling and rather painful decline. 
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